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The Incompatibility of Free Speech and Funerals:
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ROBERT F. MCCARTHY*
Since June 2005, one small Kansas church has provoked an important First
Amendment debate by trumpeting anti-gay messages during American
military funerals. Not surprisingly, jittery politicians have sought to thwart
the church's protests with dozens of statutes limiting speech near funerals
and funeral processions. Free speech advocates, in turn, have challenged
three of these funeral protest statutes. Courts have upheld two-in Missouri
and Ohio-while enjoining the third in Kentucky. In these cases, the legal
debate has centered on the privacy interest articulated by the Supreme
Court in Frisby v. Schultz and Hill v. Colorado. But that foundation may
prove infirm. Relying on the privacy interest in the funeral protest context
creates several significant legal inconsistencies and policy problems. This
Note argues that, instead of relying on the privacy interest, courts should
evaluate funeral protest statutes using the compatibility rationale that the
Supreme Court set forth in Grayned v. City of Rockford. Although the
Court has not formally adopted the compatibility rationale, the notion
appears periodically in its opinions.
The impending legal crisis over funeral protest statutes presents an ideal
opportunity for the formal establishment of this compatibility rationale,
which would guide courts when evaluating statutes that favor one speech
activity over another on the basis of the first activity's time, place, and
manner requirements. In short, the compatibility rationale would recognize
the distinctive value of time, place, and manner restrictions insulating
constitutionally protected activities that can occur in only one particular
time, place, and manner from other protected activities which may occur
just as effectively elsewhere. This rationale would help courts evaluate the
statutes in a more coherent manner. It would also assist advocates of
funeral protest statutes who, by emphasizing the incompatible nature of
political speech and funerals, could obtain several strategic advantages
that they could not achieve by solely relying on privacy. In the process, they
might also reinstate the traditional solemnity of memorials honoring fallen
American soldiers.
* Articles Editor, Ohio State Law Journal, J.D., The Ohio State University Moritz
College of Law, expected 2008. B.A. in Government, Harvard University, 2002. I thank
Leslie Siegel, Clarke Tucker, and Professor David Goldberger for their generous and
helpful contributions to the development of this Note. I also thank my maternal
grandmother, Elizabeth Fisher, for sparking my interest in matters of public concern.
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I. INTRODUCTION
At first blush, the funeral for U.S. Army Specialist Jared Hartley
resembled the traditional solemn memorial of a fallen soldier.' "Nearly half
the town" of Newkirk, Oklahoma, joined grieving family, friends, and
Hartley's fiancd to pay their last respects to the twenty-two year-old who
died in Iraq after an improvised explosive device ("IED") detonated near his
armored vehicle. 2 In keeping with tradition, an American flag covered
Specialist Hartley's coffin, and "[t]wenty-one gun shots rang across the
Oklahoma fields" in his honor.3
But Specialist Hartley's funeral proved distinctly untraditional. Across
the street, protestors held signs proclaiming "Thank God for IEDs,"
"America is Doomed," and "God Hates Fags." 4 One person brandished an
American flag, then stepped on it.5 And these protestors distributed fliers
taunting those who read them: "They turned America / Over to fags; They're
coming home / In body bags."6 The spectacle at Hartley's funeral was, as one
attendee observed, "not right." 7
Since June 2005, the small Kansas church that picketed Hartley's
memorial has wreaked similar havoc at hundreds of funerals across
America.8 Much to grieving family members' dismay, the Westboro Baptist
Church ("WBC") pairs aggressive tactics with a provocative message-that
God punishes America for its tolerance of homosexuality by killing soldiers
in Afghanistan and Iraq.9 While protests at funerals may seem patently
I Brent B. Wistrom, Funeral Marred by Protesters, WICHITA EAGLE, July 24, 2005,
at B 1.
21Id.
31d.
41d.
51Id.
61d.
7 Wistrom, supra note 1.
8 For details about other Westboro Baptist Church ("WBC") military funeral
protests, see, for example, Fred Mann, Road to Westboro, WICHITA EAGLE, Apr. 2, 2006,
at Al.
91Id.
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tasteless, they have triggered an important new battle' 0 in the long line of
First Amendment public forum doctrine cases. 11
Not surprisingly, jittery politicians have sought to thwart the WBC's
antics with dozens of statutes limiting speech near funerals and funeral
processions. 12 Defenders of free speech, in turn, have challenged these
statutes five times in court. 13 On first impression, the resulting legal
wrangling may smack of an attempt by the political majority to smother an
unpopular minority viewpoint, implicating a chief evil against which the First
Amendment protects. 14 However, closer analysis of funeral protests and the
statutes designed to limit them reveals that this situation actually presents a
much more complex problem.
By describing what occurred when WBC members and their adversaries
protested at scores of soldiers' funerals 15 between 2005 and 2007, Part II of
this Note illustrates that the trouble with speech at funerals stems not from its
extreme content, but rather from its disruptive nature. Controversial and
popular political speakers alike arguably have polluted the peaceful and quiet
atmosphere that soldiers' funerals deserve.
Of course, funerals are not the first activity that legislators have tried to
insulate from disruptive speech. Part III describes how courts have evaluated
other time, place, and manner speech restrictions that-not coincidentally-
parallel funeral protest statutes. These precedents, which establish a legally-
protected privacy interest in avoiding unwanted speech, form the basis for
current funeral protest litigation. But that foundation might prove infirm.
Part IV-which chronicles the spate of speech regulations enacted in the
wake of the WBC's protests-demonstrates that governments have been
10 A search of Westlaw and Lexis databases revealed only one prosecution of a
funeral protestor who did not belong to the WBC. See Tennessee v. Ervin, 40 S.W.3d 508
(Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) (upholding the prosecution for disorderly conduct of a protestor
who yelled "Stop killer cops" at a memorial for police officers killed in the line of duty).
11 Courts permit only "very limited" speech restrictions on public property. United
States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (invalidating a federal statute prohibiting
communicative displays outside of the Supreme Court). Speech in quintessential public
forums like sidewalks and parks possesses great First Amendment value because it
"effectively communicates an idea quickly and inexpensively" and, as such, it "is often
the only means of mass communication available to minority groups" who need
protection the most. Sylvia Arizmendi, Residential Picketing: Will the Public Forum
Follow Us Home?, 37 How. L.J. 495, 497 (1994).
12 See infra Part IV.
13 See infra Part V.
14 See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 189, 214-215 (1983).
15 This Note uses the term "funeral" broadly to include memorial services, calling
hours, wakes, and other gatherings designed for grieving.
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careful to limit funeral demonstrations without reference to their content. The
statutes restrict speech with sundry rules generally governing the time, place,
and manner when it may occur. Of particular controversy have been three
aspects of these statutes: fixed zones that limit speech a set distance from
protected activities; floating zones that prohibit speech in roving areas
following mobile protected activities; and grace periods that extend fixed and
floating zones to a time period before or after protected activities. WBC
members have challenged each of these features of funeral protest statutes
despite their acknowledgment that the statutes have stifled neither the church
nor its counterparts.16
The first wave of funeral protest cases produced irreconcilable results.
With privacy as their guiding interest, courts fumbled to explain vastly
different outcomes. Part V examines these recent decisions and highlights
how the reliance on the privacy interest caused legal inconsistencies and
policy problems. It then suggests that, so long as privacy remains the
government interest served by funeral protest statutes, these difficulties are
inevitable.
Effective protests and solemn funerals simply cannot co-exist. They are,
in other words, incompatible. A small but growing segment of case law
recognizes such dissonance as a partial justification for time, place, and
manner restrictions that prevent two clashing constitutionally protected rights
from quashing each other. 17 But the Supreme Court has never clearly
established compatibility as a government interest sufficient to justify speech
restrictions by itself.
Part VI of this Note argues that courts should use funeral protest
litigation to establish such a compatibility rationale. It also suggests how the
rationale might operate in practice. In short, courts should recognize the
distinctive value of time, place, and manner restrictions safeguarding
constitutionally protected activities that may occur only in one particular
time, place, and manner from other protected activities which may occur just
as effectively elsewhere.
By employing the compatibility rationale, courts could more effectively
evaluate the myriad funeral protest statutes that states recently have enacted.
And by emphasizing the incompatible nature of disruptive political speech
and funerals, opponents of funeral protests could obtain several strategic
advantages that relying on privacy alone would fail to achieve. This doctrinal
shift might even help to ensure that fallen soldiers like Specialist Hartley
receive the dignified memorials that they deserve.
16 See infra notes 130-59.
17 See infra Part V.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Virulent History of the Westboro Baptist Church
Funeral protests took root in 1955 when Fred Phelps established the
WBC, his small Baptist church in Topeka, Kansas.' 8 At the time, Phelps had
not yet acquired pariah status-in fact, previously, he had earned an
appointment to West Point, 19 plaudits from civil rights leaders, and even a
law degree. 20 But Phelps' early years provided hints of his colorful future:
for instance, shortly before Phelps established the WBC, Time featured a
photograph of him protesting "necking and petting" on a college campus. 21
Over the years, his congregation never affiliated with the national Baptist
organization. 22 Still, Phelps enlarged the church's membership-largely by
growing his own family through childbirth and marriage-to include nearly
seventy-five members.23 For more than fifty years, they have lived and
worshipped together on a compound near Topeka.24 But the church lacked
national attention-that is, until recently.
The WBC entered the political fray almost by accident. Irritated by city
leaders who did not respond to his letters, in 1991 Phelps demonstrated at a
Kansas public park where he believed that homosexual activities frequently
occurred.25 To his apparent surprise, Phelps' placards (which stated, "Watch
your kids. Gays in restrooms.") provoked counter-protests. 26 The resulting
attention excited Phelps and his small church. 27 Suddenly, Phelps seemed to
have found his calling, and, likewise, his church seemed to have found a
mission.28
18 Mann, supra note 8.
19 Id. Phelps, however, chose not to attend the academy.
20 Matt Sedensky, A Ministry of Hate, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 10, 2006. Phelps
later was disbarred for improper activities involving a lawsuit against a court reporter.
Mann, supra note 8.
21 Mann, supra note 8.
22 Id.
23 Sedensky, supra note 20.
24 Justin Kendall, The New Fred, KANSAS CITY PITCH WEEKLY, Nov. 2, 2006,
http://www.pitch.com/2006-11-02/news/the-new-fred/.
25 Mann, supra note 8.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
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Within several years, the WBC emerged on the national radar screen by
protesting at the funeral of Matthew Shepard. 29 Several men had brutally
murdered Shepard, a Wyoming college student, because he was gay.
30
Shepard's story gripped the nation and drew its sympathy. 31 Bucking that
sentiment, Phelps brought signs to Shepard's funeral exclaiming that "God
Hates Fags."32 As with his protests in Kansas parks, Phelps' anti-gay
messages sparked extreme outrage.33
Since that notorious episode in Wyoming, the WBC also has
demonstrated outside a variety of funerals including those for victims of the
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001; miners who died in the Sago, West
Virginia tragedy; Frank Sinatra; Barry Goldwater; gay men who died after
contracting AIDS; Mister Rogers; and Coretta Scott King.34 Fueled by the
financial support of family members, 35 Phelps claims to have protested more
than 25,000 times.36
But protests at soldiers' funerals have garnered the WBC more attention
than anything else. During 2005 and 2006, church members protested at
nearly 200 of these events37 in dozens of states.38 Each protest has followed a
somewhat predictable pattern. The group typically notifies local authorities
of its plans several days before the target funeral. 39 Then, on the day of that
funeral, protestors line a street or sidewalk nearby.40 On quieter days, church
members display signs communicating incendiary anti-gay messages. 41
Other times the protestors noisily chant and spout declarations that the
29 Sedensky, supra note 20.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. See also Mann, supra note 8.
35 Mann, supra note 8.
36 Id. Phelps also has taken his message to the political world, serving as a candidate
for offices including mayor and governor. Id.
37 Judy Keen, Funeral Protestors Say Laws Can 't Silence Them, USA TODAY, Sept.
14, 2006, at 5A.
38 Id.
39 See, e.g., Alan Feuer, Revving Their Engines, Remembering a War's Toll: With a
Chrome-Lined Cortege, the Patriot Guard Riders Pay Homage to Soldiers Killed in Iraq,
N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2006, at B 1.
40 Id.
41 Adam Jadhav, Anti-Gay Protestors Target Small-Town Soldier's Funeral, ST.
LouIs POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 9, 2005, at Al.
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memorialized soldiers will rot in hell.42 The WBC aims, with these tactics, to
shock funeral attendees so that they will hear the church's provocative
message.43
B. The Patriot Guard Bikers and Other Counter-Protestors
The news-making opportunity that military funerals present attracts more
than just anti-gay protestors. Since October 2005, a pro-military organization
named the "Patriot Guard" has contributed significantly to the chaotic scene.
This hardy group of bikers serves as a formidable adversary to the WBC,
working "to shield families from protestors and to honor fallen soldiers."44
From its first gathering with forty bikers who countered a WBC protest
in Oklahoma, the Patriot Guard has grown to include more than 60,000
members hailing from all walks of life.45 The bikers, following the WBC's
lead, normally park or stand along the road leading to a funeral site, saluting
or holding flags.46 Wearing colorful vests adorned with military regalia, the
bikers are hard to miss.47 And also like the WBC, guard members sometimes
act rambunctiously: they try to "overshadow the [WBC's] jeers with patriotic
chants and a sea of red, white and blue flags."'48 During especially spirited
standoffs, the Patriot Guard rev their motorcycle engines to "smother hateful
slogans in a Harley engine's word-obscuring roar." 49
Other groups occasionally join the Patriot Guard in seeking to overpower
the WBC's message. Members of the Veterans of Foreign Wars and the
American Legion, for example, also have countered Phelps's group.50 In
Boston, a fourteen-man bagpipe band drowned out the protestors' chants, and
42 Lizette Alvarez, Outrage at Funeral Protests Pushes Lawmakers to Act, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 17, 2006, at A14.
43 Marjory Raymer, Protestors Target Next Funeral, FLINT J., Mar. 8, 2006, at Al.
44 Jeff Seidel, Group Drowns out Words of Hate at Soldiers' Funerals: Patriot
Guard Shields Family in Grand Ledge, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Mar. 28, 2006, at 1; see
also Tim Carpenter, Standing Guard, TOPEKA CAP. J., Dec. 31, 2006, at lB.
45 Carpenter, supra note 44; see also Beccy Tanner, Some Room to Grieve, WICHITA
EAGLE, Nov. 6, 2005, at lB.
46 Seidel, supra note 44.
47 Bikers Roll to Soldiers' Funerals to Counter Anti-Gay Protesters, AP, Feb. 21,
2006, available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,185617,00.html.
48 Id.
49 Feuer, supra note 39.
50 Paul Janczewski, Supporters Counter Church Group s Funeral Protest, FLINT J.,
Mar. 12, 2006, at A2.
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police officers backed their horses' rear ends into the group.51 Less
diplomatic opposition also has met WBC protestors. The group claims that
its members have been "beaten ... and that one was punched in the face by a
sheriff in Wisconsin." 52 And vandals have targeted the WBC's facilities,
firing bullets and placing a pipe bomb near the church headquarters. 53
Taken together, the pro-military speakers sometimes offset the disruptive
effects of WBC protests.54 More often, however, Patriot Guard members and
their allies merely increase the sum of speech, detracting from the peace and
quiet of a funeral. 55 Indeed, some local authorities fear that the tension
between bikers and WBC members eventually may erupt into violence.56
Rather than cleansing the funeral environment of disruptive speech, Patriot
Guard members actually can aggravate the tainting effects created when the
WBC converts a solemn funeral into a political event. Apparently, protestors'
speech need not be unpopular to disrupt a funeral.
III. PROTEST LIMITS AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. Focused Picketing and Frisby v. Schultz
Long before the WBC hated gays, political groups tested the First
Amendment with efforts to derive communicative value through disruptions
of other groups' protected activities. 57 During the latter half of the twentieth
51 Commentary, Voice of the Times: Demonstrators Drowned Out at Hero's
Funeral, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, July 7, 2005, at B7.
52 Mann, supra note 8.
53 Id.
54 Jason George, Bikers Come, Protestors Go: Members of Group 25,000 Strong
Stand Guard at Funeral, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 20, 2006, at 1; see also Feuer, supra note 39
(offering that sometimes the WBC has cancelled planned protests after learning that
Patriot Guard representatives would attend).
55 The Patriot Guard's disruptive effect occurs despite the general popularity of their
message. See, e.g., George, supra note 54 (explaining that the "Patriot Guard Riders'
wholesome aim to protect grieving families from hate speech appears to be a cause with
which few can disagree").
56 See, e.g., Jason Stein, Biker Barrier Motorcyclists Shield Mourners from
Protestors, WISCONSIN STATE JOURNAL, Feb. 17, 2006, at B 1.
57 Courts historically have held that the right to free speech in the public forum
applies to even the most unpopular speakers-speakers arguably more offensive than
protestors outside funerals. See, e.g., Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978) (declaring unconstitutional a Skokie, Illinois ordinance
prohibiting speech activities designed to promote hatred based upon the heritage of
another). The Supreme Court has explained that public forum speech carries so much
value that sometimes "citizens [in public spaces] must tolerate insulting, and even
[Vol. 68:14691476
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century, federal courts evaluated government attempts to suppress similarly
provocative protests near sites as varied as abortion clinics, embassies, voting
locations, and churches. Such efforts generally fall into two categories:
"fixed zones," limits on speech within a set distance of a stationary protected
activity; and "floating zones," speech-free zones that follow a roving
protected activity. Courts typically review these restrictions with the familiar
intermediate scrutiny approach that evaluates a time, place, and manner
restriction by testing whether it is "'narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government interest [while leaving] open ample alternative channels of
communication."' 58
What distinguishes the funeral protest situation from cases that appear to
be its doctrinal ancestors is the extreme proliferation of statutory responses
and legal challenges that have occurred during a brief period of time, thanks
to the WBC. As this Section explains, the privacy interest is not equipped to
handle the impending crisis. The murky existing doctrine simply lacks the
ability to distinguish the statutes and their varied approaches to limiting
speech.
outrageous, speech in order to provide 'adequate "breathing space" to the freedoms
protected by the First Amendment."' Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988) (quoting
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988)).
58 McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975, 981 (E.D. Ky. 2006) (quoting Frisby
v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988)); Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, No. 06-4156-CV-C-FJG,
2007 WL 273437, at * 2 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 26, 2007) (notice of appeal filed 2/1/07). Courts
afford a more deferential, intermediate level of scrutiny to regulations that limit only the
time, place, and manner of expression, without reference to what idea the expression
communicates. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). By
contrast, only very exceptional important government interests can justify regulations
directed at one particular message. Compare Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992)
(upholding a 100-foot, content-specific limit around polling sites) with Police Dep't of
Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (invalidating a 150-foot, content-specific speech
ban near schools because it singled out speech that was unrelated to labor disputes and
explaining that "above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content").
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Frisby v. Schultz stands as the landmark case in fixed-zone litigation. 59
In Frisby, the Supreme Court upheld a municipal ordinance prohibiting
"focused picketing" near private residences. 60 Frisby established that the
"protection of the unwilling listener," especially at home,61 constitutes a
significant government interest. The Court explained the special weight of
this privacy interest at home, where speech literally may captivate unwilling
listeners. In effect, those offended by speech there simply cannot avoid it.
62
After announcing the privacy interest, the Frisby Court proceeded with a
routine intermediate scrutiny analysis that found narrow tailoring because the
ordinance reached no more speech than necessary-only speech "narrowly
directed at the household, not the public."63 The Court also declared, without
significant discussion, that it was "virtually self-evident that ample
alternatives remain" because the statute left available contact through
telephone calls, literature distribution, and door-to-door communication.
64
Given this cursory analysis, the Frisby privacy interest apparently justifies a
relaxed approach to the tailoring and ample alternative requirements of the
intermediate scrutiny test.
Other recent cases mimic Frisby's approach. The Court in Boos v. Barry
upheld a ban on multi-person protests within 500 feet of foreign government
buildings in Washington, D.C., without explaining what demanded that
59 For litigants' and courts' reliance on the reasoning of Frisby, see, for example,
Nixon, 2007 WL 273437, at *3, citing Frisby for the notion "that the state had an interest
in protecting citizens in their residences from unwanted communications," and
McQueary, 453 F. Supp. 2d passim. For critical analysis of the Frisby decision, see
Robert E. Rigby, Jr., Comment, Balancing Free Speech in a Public Forum vs. Residential
Privacy: Frisby v. Schultz, 24 NEW ENG. L. REv. 889, 914 (1990), arguing that Frisby
"seriously undermined the fundamental right to freely express an opinion in public"; see
also Leading Cases: Residential Picketing, 102 HARv. L. REv. 261, 268 (1988)
(explaining that the Court "sharply undercut the logic and force of its holding" by
limiting its protections to private homes when "[t]he theory of residential
privacy.., applies with equal if not greater force to picketing of an entire block or
neighborhood...."); Todd R. Seelman, Note, The Illusion of Residential Privacy: The
Doctrine of Time, Place, and Manner Regulation Revisited: Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S. Ct.
2495 (1988), 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 447, 471-74 (1989) (arguing that the Court erred
because the Brookfield statute was overbroad).
60 Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988). The challenged statute reads: "It is
unlawful for any person to engage in picketing before or about the residence or dwelling
of any individual in the Town of Brookfield." Id. at 477. The Frisby Court employed
intermediate scrutiny after accepting-without questioning-the lower court's
determination that the ordinance was content neutral. Id. at 481-82.
6 1 Id. at 484-85.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 486.
64 Id. at 483-84.
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specific distance. 65 In Burson v. Freeman, several years later, the Court
upheld a Tennessee fixed zone that prohibited speech within 100 feet of
polling places, while similarly punting on the tailoring analysis. 66 And, in
Madsen v. Women's Health Center, the Supreme Court upheld an injunction
that imposed a thirty-six-foot fixed zone around the entrance of an abortion
clinic as well as a prohibition on noisy protests outside the clinic.67 In each of
these cases, the Court analyzed tailoring and ample alternatives briefly and
failed to clarify how to define precisely the legally permissible boundary of
privacy-based speech restrictions.
Still, the privacy interest apparently has limits. It has failed to justify
fixed zones in a handful of cases that are difficult to distinguish factually
from the primary holdings in Frisby, Boos, Burson, and Madsen. For
example, Madsen itself invalidated as overbroad portions of the injunction
that protected homes of abortion clinic employees.68 The Court in Madsen
explained that the 300-foot fixed zone-200 feet smaller than the one that the
Court upheld in Boos-would affect more protected speech than the
ordinance in Frisby did.69
65 Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988). The challenged provision protecting
embassies and consulates made it illegal to "congregate within 500 feet of any such
building or premises, and refuse to disperse after having been ordered so to do by the
police authorities" of the District of Columbia. Id. at 316. The Boos Court upheld the law
after finding that it "merely regulate[d] the place and manner of certain demonstrations"
without "reach[ing] a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct." Id. at
331-32. For an argument that Boos is inconsistent with Frisby, see generally Lee B.
Madinger, Comment, Free Speech in Public Places: Application of the Perry Analysis in
Picketing Cases, 11 WHITrIER L. REv. 267 (1989).
66 504 U.S. 191 (1992). The challenged statute in Burson prohibited "the display of
campaign posters, signs, or other campaign materials, distribution of campaign materials,
and solicitation of votes for or against any person or political party or position" within
100 feet of polling buildings and their entrances. Id. at 193-94.
67 512 U.S. 753 (1994). The Court treated the restrictions that it reviewed in Madsen
"more stringent[ly]" than it does statutes in most public forum cases because of the
chilling potential of an injunction, as opposed to that of a general regulation. Id at
764-65. The Madsen injunction prohibited (1) "congregating, picketing, patrolling,
demonstrating or entering... within [thirty-six] feet" of the clinic, unless on adjacent
private property; (2) "singing, chanting, whistling, shouting, yelling, use of bullhorns,
auto horns, sound amplification equipment or other sounds or images observable to or
within earshot of the patients inside the Clinic"; (3) approaching patients within 300 feet
of the clinic, unless invited; and (4) "approaching, congregating, picketing, patrolling" or
demonstrating outside the homes of clinic employees. Id. at 759-60.
68 Id. at 776.
69 Id. at 775. The Court also invalidated aspects of the Madsen injunction that
limited speech on private property. In addition, it determined that the section of the
injunction limiting observable images unconstitutionally obliged patients' discomfort
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More recently, the Eighth Circuit invalidated a ban on focused pickets of
religious premises in Olmer v. City of Lincoln.70 Although the Olmer Court
did not deny that the City of Lincoln's restrictions strongly resembled those
upheld in Frisby, it expressly declined to extend Frisby--parroting the
Frisby justification that "the home is different, and, in [the court's] view,
unique." 71 Rather than affirming the law with Frisby's powerful privacy
justification, the Eighth Circuit declared that the Lincoln ordinance
impermissibly affected more speech than was necessary to serve its
government interest: protecting children from frightening images. 72
Courts' ability to find improper tailoring in Madsen and Olmer despite
the similarities between the invalidated injunctions and those approved in
other Supreme Court cases strengthens the argument that the strength of the
Frisby-based government interest underlying a fixed zone-the main factual
difference in these cases-might determine the constitutionality of a privacy-
based restriction.73 Regardless, Frisby and its progeny currently do not
with the content of images that they could easily avoid by closing the clinic's curtains. Id.
at 773. The Madsen Court also invalidated as overbroad-because they would reach
more protected speech than necessary-the aspects of the injunction that limited personal
approach within 300 feet. Id. at 776.
70 192 F.3d 1176, 1182 (8th Cir. 1999). The Olmer ordinance prohibited protestors
from "intentionally or knowingly... engag[ing] in focused picketing of a scheduled
religious activity at any time within the period from one-half hour before to one-half hour
after the scheduled activity ... in the immediate vicinity of religious premises, or moving
in a repeated manner past or around religious premises." Id. at 1179. The court assumed
that the limit operated in a content-neutral fashion. Id. at 1180. It also accepted as
important the interest cited in the case by the City of Lincoln, namely the protection of
"very young children from frightening images." Id. Even so, the Eighth Circuit
invalidated the ordinance. Id. at 1182.
71 Id. at 1182 (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Courts' reluctance to extend the captive audience doctrine to new
contexts also arguably appeared in the Hill decision. See Kristen G. Cowan, Note, The
Tailoring of Statutory Bubble Zones: Balancing Free Speech and Patients' Rights, 91 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 385, 421 (2001) (analyzing the Supreme Court's decision to
rely on "the government's interests in ensuring clinic access and safeguarding patients'
emotional and physical health" rather than the privacy doctrine).
72 Olmer, 192 F.3d at 1180.
73 Scholars have suggested that the Court's kaleidoscopic approach to narrow
tailoring actually depends on implicit valuations of the government interest involved.
Rachel Entman, Note, Picket Fences: Analyzing the Court's Treatment of Restrictions of
Polling, Abortion and Labor Picketers, 90 GEO. L.J. 2581 (2002); see also Patti Stanley,
Does the Right to Free Speech Trump the Right to Worship?, 23 U. ARK. LIT-rLE ROCK L.
REv. 273, 289 (2000) (arguing that Olmer demonstrates how importantly "the choice of
interest and the weight given to that interest" figure in determining whether a statute
passes constitutional muster). For another explanation of the Court's tailoring analysis in
recent cases, see Alan K. Chen, Statutory Speech Bubbles, First Amendment
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provide a precise rule about when fixed zone speech restrictions violate the
First Amendment.
Only sparse precedent exists to indicate the Supreme Court's approach to
floating zones.74 But courts appear to scrutinize the tailoring of such zones.
Two recent cases frame the law in this area. In the first, Schenck v. Pro-
Choice Network of Western New York, the Court declared a law establishing
fifteen-foot floating zones around visitors and cars near abortion clinics
unconstitutionally overbroad. 75 Schenck left floating zones with questionable
constitutional status until Hill v. Colorado.76 In Hill, the Court upheld a
Colorado statute establishing an eight-foot floating zone around patients
within 100 feet of health care facilities.77 The Court distinguished the
Overbreadth, and Improper Legislative Purpose, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 31, 67
(2003), arguing that "the Court may be moving toward an understanding of overbreadth
that focuses not on precision, but on the challenged law's equal treatment (or
mistreatment) of different types of speakers."
74 See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 377-80 (1997).
For a discussion of how states regulate such zones in the funeral protest context, see
supra Part III.
75 Id. at 378. Schenck's floating zone failed the tailoring test because it would make
"attempts to stand 15 feet from someone entering or leaving a clinic and to communicate
a message ... hazardous." Id. at 378. The resulting chilling effect "burden[ed] more
speech than necessary to serve the relevant governmental interests," and the Court
declared the floating zones invalid. Id. at 379. The Schenck Court also upheld a fifteen-
foot fixed zone outside clinics. Id. at 383.
76 530 U.S. 703, 712 (2000). However, the Schenck decision did not isolate floating
zones for Court evaluation because, the Court found, fixed zones alone could adequately
safeguard the government interest in protecting "a woman's freedom to seek pregnancy-
related services." Schenck, 519 U.S. at 376-77. The Schenck Court did not address the
government interest, similar to that affirmed in Frisby, in "protecting the medical privacy
and well-being of patients held 'captive' by medical circumstance." Id. at 376 n.8. The
interest in protecting patients' ability to enter the clinic justified fixed zones around its
entrances but not floating zones that might affect more speech than necessary. Id. at 377.
77 Hill, 530 U.S. at 725-26. The Colorado statute prohibited protestors from
"knowingly approach[ing] another person within eight feet of such person" without
consent and with the goal of "passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or
engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling" when "within a radius of one hundred
feet from any entrance door to a health care facility." Id. at 708. The government interests
at stake included ensuring "unimpeded access to health care facilities and the avoidance
of potential trauma to patients associated with confrontational protests," as well as
protecting "[t]he unwilling listener's interest in avoiding unwanted communication." Id.
at 715-16. This interest justified intermediate scrutiny, under which the Court upheld the
statute. Id. at 725-29. For criticism of the extension of the captive audience doctrine to
Hill, see, for example, Jamin B. Raskin & Clark L. LeBlanc, Disfavored Speech About
Favored Rights: Hill v. Colorado, The Vanishing Public Forum and the Need for an
Objective Speech Discrimination Test, 51 AM. U.L. REv. 179, 202 (2001), stating that
"[t]he Court's surprising identification of the unwilling listener interest as a strong
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Colorado floating zone from the one that it invalidated in Schenck by
emphasizing its smaller size (eight feet, as opposed to fifteen in Schenck).78
In justifying the set distance found in Colorado's floating zone-although
not its specific size-the Hill Court explained that a "bright-line prophylactic
rule may be the best way to provide protection, and, at the same time, by
offering clear guidance and avoiding subjectivity, to protect speech itself."'79
With only two cases demonstrating the Supreme Court's approach to
floating zones, and especially because both of the cases involved restrictions
in the same context-abortion clinics-floating zone law remains a nascent
concept. If for no other reason, future funeral protest cases may prove
interesting for their ability to clarify the law in this area.
B. Uncertainty Following Frisby
The law's current approach to fixed-zone and floating-zone restrictions
produces at least four problems that might surprise courts and litigants
attempting to rely on Frisby and its successors. First, although this Note
argues that a court's estimation of a government interest ultimately
determines the validity of a statute, courts sometimes fail to evaluate a
Frisby-based interest carefully. 80 That could change. In other contexts, the
potential counterweight to traditional public forum free speech rights is a most troubling
development, but also puzzling in its doctrinal ramifications." See also Brian W. Oberst,
Note, Buffering Free Speech: An Examination of the Impact of Colorado's Buffer Zone
Law on Protected Speech after Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000), 24 HAMLINE L.
REv. 89 (2000).
78 Hill, 530 U.S. at 726-27. For doubts about the Court's distinctions between Hill,
Schenck, and Madsen, see Allison Lange, Note, Statute Regulating Speech and Speech-
Related Conduct Within 100-Feet of An Entrance to a Health Care Facility is a
Narrowly-Tailored Content-Neutral Time, Place, and Manner Regulation, 11 SETON
HALL CONST. L.J. 429, 464-67 (2001), declaring that the statute in Hill creates
"undefined prohibited conduct and unclear boundary lines [that] will undoubtedly curtail
the freedom of speech." For a critique of Hill as an anti-speech decision, see generally
Raskin & LeBlanc, supra note 77.
79 Hill, 530 U.S. at 729. The Colorado law also included a knowing mental state
requirement that prevented accidental law violations by speakers and therefore minimized
its chilling effect. Id. at 727.
80 For example, the Supreme Court's discussion of the protection of the unwilling
listener in Hill appears "in a single footnote... cavalierly .... [And t]he Court neither
explained what level of interest the protection of unwilling listeners rises to nor defined
the acceptable parameters of its use by governments to restrict speech." Jennifer L.
Maffett, Note, Balancing Freedom of Speech Against the Rights of Unwilling Listeners:
The Attack on the First Amendment in Hill v. Colorado, 26 U. DAYTON L. REv. 327, 362
(2001).
1482 [Vol. 68:1469
FREE SPEECH AND FUNERALS
Court has diligently evaluated the importance and applicability of an
ostensible government interest before upholding a statute. 81
A second problem with relying on privacy to evaluate funeral protest
statutes stems from courts' recent habit of leniently determining whether
focused picketing statutes operate in a content-neutral or content-specific
fashion. For example, in Hill, the Supreme Court found that limits on speech
directed at patients of abortion clinics were content-neutral. 82 But legal
scholars question whether these restrictions actually intended to limit-or
had the effect of limiting-any kind of speech other than that which opposed
abortion rights.83
Third, focused picketing decisions almost dismissively have overlooked
the requirement of alternative channels for speakers. 84 Persuasive arguments
that speech derives symbolic or practical value from its context apparently
have not convinced Frisby-focused courts that limiting where and when
81 See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992). In Burson, the Court held that
the history of fraud and intimidation in elections justified establishing fixed zones even
though they limited speech at a time when it might best reach a particular audience. The
Burson Court acknowledged that "how large a restricted zone is permissible or
sufficiently tailored" is a difficult question. Id. at 208 (emphasis removed). But it
indicated that justifying the 100-foot span of the statute with particularity was
unnecessary and impossible. Id. at 208-09. The Court also suggested that selecting a
particular distance for a speech-free zone is unavoidably arbitrary and that the distance is
not critical to the tailoring analysis; indeed, the Court found that the difference between
the existing 100-foot zone and a twenty-five foot zone was insignificant because it "takes
approximately 15 seconds to walk 75 feet." Id. at 210 (quoting Freeman v. Burson, 802
S.W.2d 210, 215 (Tenn. 1990)).
82 Hill, 530 U.S. at 719-20.
83 A debate currently rages about the content-neutrality of the statute in Hill.
Compare Hill, 530 U.S. at 715 ("[T]he legislative history makes it clear that [the Hill
statute's] enactment was primarily motivated by activities in the vicinity of abortion
clinics.") and Raskin & LeBlanc, supra note 77, at 213 (proclaiming that the "statute's
operation strongly suggests a purpose to curb anti-abortion speech") and Chen, supra
note 73 at 56 (describing "powerful evidence that the legislature's principal or only
concern was anti-abortion protestors") with Cowan, supra note 71, at 417-18 (arguing
that the statute was content neutral because "[t]here is no evidence that... the Colorado
legislature was specifically targeting the anti-abortion viewpoint" and "an abortion
advocate approaching a patient within eight feet to educate about benefits of abortion also
would violate this provision").
84 See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483 (1988) ("[T]he limited nature of the
prohibition makes it virtually self-evident that ample alternatives remain."); Hill, 530
U.S. at 780-81 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[T]he law forecloses peaceful leafletting, a
mode of speech with deep roots in our Nation's history and traditions."); Olmer v. City of
Lincoln, 192 F.3d 1176, 1187 (8th Cir. 1999) ("The picketers may protest as much as
they wish across the street, or anywhere else for that matter, except in the limited areas
set forth in the ordinance.").
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speech may occur inevitably changes what a speaker can say. 85 For example,
protestors outside embassies in Washington might argue that they could not
reach their target audience without drawing nearer to embassies, and
protestors outside abortion clinics might say that their message would lack
value if they could not communicate it before abortion clinic patients crossed
the threshold into the protected interior of the facilities.
Rather than government interests, content-neutrality, or alternative
channels, the superficial action in recent focused picketing cases has centered
on the tailoring requirement. Indeed, whenever courts have declared a
focused picketing statute unconstitutional, they have done so because of
overbreadth. 86 But even this analysis is consistently unpredictable. Tailoring
requirements present the fourth problem with relying on Frisby's privacy
interest. The permissible size of a fixed zone seems very unsteady: the
Supreme Court found 500 feet from embassies 87 and 100 feet from polling
locations 88 permissible, yet it also invalidated a 300-foot fixed zone around
homes of abortion clinic employees. 89 And around similar abortion clinics,
85 See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56-58 (1994) (invalidating a city
ordinance banning the use of yard signs because of the unique value of a message in that
context); see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REv.
46, 68 (1987) (explaining that limiting speech at a particular location "may have a
significant effect on those speakers whose messages are tied.. . to" the location. "By
denying these speakers access to what are the most logical targets of their expression,
such regulations deprive them of access to the most important audience and prevent them
from utilizing especially dramatic and effective means of communication."); Timothy
Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, 84 TEx. L. REv. 581, 601 (2006) (describing how
buffer zones "substantially burden rights of association and expression near clinics
[and] ... rob speakers of proximity and immediacy that is critical to their message"). But
see Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800 (1989) (explaining that a
"regulation will not be invalid simply because a court concludes that the government's
interest could be adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive alternative").
86 See, e.g., Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 371 (1997);
Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 775 (1994); Olmer, 192 F.3d at
1180. Such willingness to employ the overbreadth doctrine stands in stark contrast to a
general trend wherein the Supreme Court does so sparingly and only after finding highly
substantial overbreadth. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINcIPLEs AND
POLICIES 912-16 (2d ed. 2002).
8 7 Boos, 485 U.S. at 331-32.
88 Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191,208 (1992).
89 Madsen, 512 U.S. at 775. The Madsen Court simply said that the "record before
us does not contain sufficient justification for this broad a ban on picketing; it appears
that a limitation on the time, duration of picketing, and number of pickets outside a
smaller zone could have accomplished the desired result." Id.
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the Supreme Court found an eight-foot floating zone constitutional in
Colorado,9" but not a fifteen-foot zone in New York.9'
Constitutional limits of fixed and floating zones remain unclear. In recent
cases, the Supreme Court has not scrutinized the requirements of sufficient
government interests, content-neutrality, and availability of alternatives in
focused picketing statutes. In addition, the Court's evaluation of such
statutes' tailoring has proved very unpredictable. Although this Note argues
that the use of Frisby as a governmental interest essentially overrides the
other aspects of the intermediate scrutiny test, courts could change course.
Frisby might fail to justify a particular limit, or courts might employ the
neglected aspects more forcefully. Thus, although Frisby and the cases that
followed it appear to permit some fixed zones and floating zones which
protect substantial government interests, they also may conceal legal
landmines that could surprise litigants in future cases.
IV. STATE RESPONSES TO THE CRISIS
A. Legislative Efforts to Protect Funerals
Fears of funeral protests have sparked legislative efforts throughout the
United States. In 2006, for example, Congress enacted the "Respect for
America's Fallen Heroes Act" to prohibit demonstrations near soldiers'
funerals. 92 Even municipal governments have waded into the funeral protests
quagmire. 93 But the greatest amount and variety of responses to maneuvers
by the WBC and its rivals-and the only type of response challenged thus far
90 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 730 (2000).
91 Schenck, 519 U.S. at 377-79; see also Cowan, supra note 71, at 423 (arguing that
a fifteen-foot bubble zone would foreclose alternative means of communication while
eight feet would not because within eight feet, "people still could communicate but
harassment would be prevented").
92 38 U.S.C.A. § 2413 (Supp. 2007). The "Respect for America's Fallen Heroes
Act" bans demonstrations outside funerals for soldiers one hour before and after a
funeral, memorial service, or ceremony, when such protests occur within 150 feet of any
road or path leading into the property and when the protestor's intent is to disturb, as well
as within 300 feet if it is not intended to disturb the funeral. Id. In addition to picketing,
the federal law prohibits "oration, speech, use of sound amplification equipment or
device, or similar conduct" as well as "the display of any placard, banner, flag or similar
device" and the "distribution of any handbill, pamphlet, leaflet, or other written or printed
matter" unless any of these behaviors or items is part of the funeral itself. Id.
93 See, e.g., Denny Boyles, Fresno City Council Bans Protests at Funerals, FRESNO
BEE, Dec. 13, 2006, at B 1.
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in court-has occurred at the state level. As of October 1, 2007, at least
forty-three states had enacted funeral protest statutes.94
The state statutes differ in several key respects. 95 Most litigation thus far
has focused on the size of fixed zones, which prohibit speech within a certain
distance of a protected activity.96 Although all generally resemble fixed
zones that the Court approved in Boos, Burson, and Frisby, zone sizes vary
tremendously among the states. Most common are the 500-foot restrictions
94 This Note focuses on the state statutes because of their varied approaches to the
funeral protests problem and also because, to date, litigation has focused on these
statutes-and not on their federal or municipal counterparts. The statutes include: ALA.
CODE § 13-A-1 1-17 (LexisNexis Supp. 2006); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-230 (Supp.
2006); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-108 (West 2006); Act of June 6, 2007, Conn.
Legis. Serv. P.A. 07-98 (West); DEL. CODE ANN. tit..11, § 1303 (Supp. 2006); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 871.01 (West Supp. 2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-34.2 (Supp. 2006);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6409 (Supp. 2007); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/26-6 (West
Supp. 2007); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-1-3 (West 2006); IOWA CODE ANN. § 723.5 (West
Supp. 2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4015 (1995); Funeral Privacy Act, ch. 111, 2007
Kan. Sess. Laws S.B. 244 (amending KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4015); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 525.145 (LexisNexis Supp. 2006), enjoined by McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d
975 (E.D. Ky. 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:103 (Supp. 2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17-A, § 501-A (2007); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 10-205 (LexisNexis Supp.
2006); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 42A (LexisNexis 1992); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN.
§ 123.1113 (West 2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.501 (West Supp. 2007); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 97-35-18 (West Supp. 2006); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 578.501-03 (West Supp. 2007);
Act of Mar. 16, 2007, ch. 10, 2007 Mont. Laws S.B. 15 (amending MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 45-8-1); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1320.01 (LexisNexis Supp. 2006); Act of July 17,
2007, ch. 370, § 2, 2007 N.H. Laws 560 (amending N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644 by
inserting § 644:2-b); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:33-8.1 (West Supp. 2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
30-53-3 (West 2007); Assemb. B. 2385, 2007 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2007) (amending
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.21); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-288.4 (Supp. 1 2006); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-31-01.1 (2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.30 (West Supp. 2006);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1380 (West Supp. 2007); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7517
(West Supp. 2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-11-1 (2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-525
(2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-13-17 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-317 (2006);
TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.055 (Vernon Supp. 2006); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-108
(Supp. 2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-415 (Supp. 2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3771
(2006); Act of Feb. 2, 2007, ch. 2, § 1, 2007 Wash. Legis. Serv. 6 (West) (amending
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.84.030); WIS. STAT. § 947.011 (West Supp. 2006); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 6-6-105 (2007).
95 A typical statute, in Wisconsin, bans protests occurring one hour before or after a
funeral and within 500 feet of the funeral site. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 947.011 (West Supp.
2006). Reflecting the popularity of such efforts, this statute passed the Wisconsin Senate
by a thirty-three to zero vote and the Wisconsin House by a vote of ninety-two to three.
Jason Stein, Legislature Passes Bill Limiting Funeral Protests, Wis. ST. J., Feb. 3, 2006,
at Al.
96 See infra Part V.A.
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standing in fourteen states.97 Towards the one extreme, four states-
Mississippi, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Texas-prohibit speech
within 1,000 feet of a funeral site.98 Montana restricts speech within 1,500
feet. 99 Other states limit speech in smaller areas. For example, Ohio
proscribes speech activities within 300 feet of a funeral site. 100 Illinois and
Utah employ 200-foot fixed zones, 10 1 and Arkansas, Connecticut, and New
Hampshire restrict speech within 150 feet of funerals. 10 2 Towards the other
extreme, four states--Colorado, Maryland, New York, and Vermont-
prohibit picketing only within 100 feet of a funeral service. 10 3 Like the
ordinance at issue in Frisby, statutes in Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maine, Missouri, Rhode Island, and Virginia provide no specific distance
97 See ALA. CODE § 13-A-i 1-17 (LexisNexis Supp. 2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-
34.2 (Supp. 2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-1-3 (West 2006); IOWA CODE ANN. § 723.5
(West Supp. 2007); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272 § 42A (LexisNexis 1992); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 123.1113(West 2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.501 (West Supp. 2007);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C.33-8.1 (West Supp. 2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-53-3 (West
2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1380 (West Supp. 2007); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 7517 (West Supp. 2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-317 (2006); Act of Feb. 2, 2007,
ch. 2, § 1, 2007 Wash. Legis. Serv. 6 (West) (amending WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.84.030); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 947.011 (West Supp. 2006).
98 MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-35-18 (West Supp. 2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-13-
19 (2006);TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.055 (Vernon Supp. 2006).
99 Act of Mar. 16, 2007, ch. 10, 2007 Mont. Laws S.B. 15 (amending MONT. CODE
ANN. § 45-8-1).
100 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.30 (West Supp. 2007); see also DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, § 1303 (Supp. 2006); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 578.501-03 (West Supp. 2007); NEB.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1320.02 (LexisNexis Supp. 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.4
(Supp. 1 2006); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31-01.1 (2007); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-6-105
(2007).
101 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/26-6 (West Supp. 2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-
108 (Supp. 2007).
. 102 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-230 (Supp. 2006); Act of June 6, 2007, 2007 Conn.
Legis. Serv. Pub. Acts 07-98 (West); Act of July 17, 2007, ch. 370, § 2, 2007 N.H. Laws
560 (amending N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644 by inserting § 644:2-b). In addition to their
150-foot fixed zones, Connecticut and New Hampshire also limit speech within 300 feet
of the entrance of a funeral location. Act of June 6, 2007, 2007 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A.
07-98 (West); Act of July 17, 2007, ch. 370, § 2, 2007 N.H. Laws 560 (amending N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 644 by inserting § 644:2-b).
103 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-108 (West 2006); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW
§ 10-205 (LexisNexis Supp. 2006); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.21 (Gould 2007); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, § 3771 (2006).
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restrictions, instead "leaving it to courts and law enforcement" to determine
what is appropriate. 104
A second litigated aspect of funeral protest statutes concerns limits that
they impose on speech near processions to and from a funeral. 10 5 Such limits
effectively create "floating zones" where protests may not occur through
roving sections of a community-similar to the zone around visitors to
abortion clinics that the Court upheld in Hill. Of the fourteen floating zone
provisions that states have enacted, eleven prohibit speech the same distance
away from processions as they do for funerals. 10 6 Unique among the states,
Delaware's floating zone spans larger than its fixed zone-1000 feet as
opposed to 300 feet. 10 7 Two states-Indiana and Washington-include
special mental state requirements for violations of floating zones, ensuring
that protestors know about a nearby procession before they may be found
guilty of illegally demonstrating near it.'0 8 And seven states prohibit
speakers' activities that impede-or attempt to impede-a procession.10 9
104 Jonathan Rivoli, Lawmakers OK Ban on Protests at Funerals, ST. LouIs POST-
DISPATCH, Feb. 22, 2006, at B4 (referring to Missouri). In an interesting tactic,
Missouri's legislature enacted two provisions that limit funeral protests. One bans speech
"in front of or about any location at which a funeral is held." MO. ANN. STAT. § 578.501
(West Supp. 2007). The second, a fixed zone, goes into effect only if a court deems the
first unconstitutional. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 578.502-503 (West Supp. 2007). For additional
statutes that do not specify a fixed zone distance, see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 871.01 (West
Supp. 2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6409 (Supp. 2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4015
(2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:103 (Supp. 2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §
501-A (2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-11-1 (2007);VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-415 (Supp.
2006).
10 5 See infra Part V.A.
106 See IOWA CODE ANN. § 723.5 (West Supp. 2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4015
(1995); Funeral Privacy Act, ch. 111, 2007 Kan. Sess. Laws S.B. 244 (amending KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-4015); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 525.145 (LexisNexis Supp. 2006),
enjoined by McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975 (E.D. Ky. 2006); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:103 (Supp. 2007); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 10-205 (LexisNexis Supp.
2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 123.1113 (West 2006); MO. ANN. STAT.
§§ 578.501-03 (West Supp. 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C.33-8.1 (West Supp. 2007);
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-288.4 (Supp. 1 2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.30
(West Supp. 2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-317 (2006). But see NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 28-1320.02 (LexisNexis Supp. 2006) (excepting processions from its
prohibitions).
107 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1303 (2007).
108 IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-1-3 (West 2006); Act of Feb. 2, 2007, ch. 2, § 1, 2007
Wash. Legis. Serv. 6 (West) (amending WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.84.030).
109 ALA. CODE § 13-A-i 1-17 (LexisNexis Supp. 2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-
34.2 (Supp. 2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.501 (West Supp. 2006); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 97-35-18 (West Supp. 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:33-8.1 (West Supp. 2007); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-9-108; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 947.011 (West Supp. 2006).
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Finally, litigants have challenged "grace periods" that limit speech
during certain time periods before and after funerals. 110 Nineteen states
provide one hour grace periods."' In Arkansas, Illinois, and South Carolina,
a similar restriction exists for thirty minutes. 112 Delaware, Michigan,
Nebraska, and Vermont limit speech one hour before and two hours after a
service. 113 Other states-those that do not specify similar grace periods-
appear to limit speech only during a funeral itself.114
In addition to regulating the times and places in which protests may
occur, some statutes prohibit specific modes of funeral protesting.
Restrictions also vary as to which kinds of tactics they limit. 15 Their mental
110 See Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 1309, 1315, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997).
l11 Act of June 6, 2007, 2007 Conn. Legis. Serv. 07-98 (West); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 16-11-34.2 (Supp. 2006); IOWA CODE ANN. § 723.5 (West Supp. 2007); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 609.501 (West Supp. 2007); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-35-18 (West Supp. 2006);
Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 578.501-03 (West Supp. 2007); Act of Mar. 16, 2007, ch. 10, 2007
Mont. Laws 15 (amending MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-1); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C.33-8.1
(West Supp. 2007); Act of July 17, 2007, ch. 370, § 2, 2007 N.H. Laws 560 (amending
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644 by inserting § 644:2-b); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.4 (Supp.
1 2006); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31-01.1 (2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.30
(West Supp. 2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1380 (West Supp. 2007); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 7514 (West Supp. 2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-13-17 (2006); TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.055 (Vernon Supp. 2006); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-108; Wis.
STAT. Ann. § 947.011 (West Supp. 2006); WHO. STAT. ANN. § 6-6-105 (2007).
112 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-230 (Supp. 2006); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/26-6
(West Supp. 2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-525 (2006).
113 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1303 (Supp. 2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 123.1113 (West 2006); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1320.03 (LexisNexis Supp. 2006);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3771 (2006).
114 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 871.01 (West Supp. 2007); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-
45-1-3 (West 2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 501-A (2007); MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIM. LAW § 10-205 (LexisNexis 2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-53-3 (West 2007); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 240.21 (Gould 2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 1-11-1 (2007); Act of Feb. 2,
2007, ch. 2, § 1, 2007 Wash. Legis. Serv. 6 (West) (amending WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.84.030).
115 Alabama's statute, for example, limits whistling and the "honking [of] a motor
vehicle horn." ALA. CODE § 13-A-11-17 (LexisNexis Supp. 2006). Pennsylvania
prohibits the:
[U]se of sound amplification equipment or device or similar conduct that is not part
of a commemorative service... display of any placard, sign, banner, flag or similar
device, unless such display is part of a commemorative service [or the] distribution
of any handbill, pamphlet, leaflet or other written or printed matter, other than a
program distributed as part of a commemorative service.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7517 (West Supp. 2007). Illinois specifies that protestors may
not use fighting words or hate speech during a funeral. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/26-6
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state requirements differ tremendously. 16 And finally, the events receiving
protection from statutes vary widely."17 Litigants have not yet challenged
these features of funeral protest statutes.
(West Supp. 2007). The Illinois statute's focus on disruptive speech resulted from
negotiations with the cemetery workers' union in that state, which demanded that the
state legislature not eliminate the right to picket quietly and peacefully outside funerals.
See John Patterson, Senate Votes to Prohibit Protests at Funerals, CHI. DAILY HERALD,
Apr. 6, 2006, at 7. On the other hand, Colorado's statute enables prosecution of speech
only when it constitutes significant interference with a funeral. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 18-9-108 (West 2006).
116 Some funeral protest statutes allow prosecution only if a judge finds that a
protestor possesses a particular mental state. A few require intentional, willful, or
purposeful behavior. See ALA. CODE § 13-A-i 1-17 (LexisNexis Supp. 2006); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 5-71-230 (Supp. 2006); Act of June 6, 2007, 2007 Conn. Legis. Serv. 07-98
(West); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1303 (Supp. 2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-34.2
(Supp. 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:103 (Supp. 2007); MINN. STAT.- § 609.501 (West
Supp. 2007); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-35-18 (West Supp. 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C.33-
8.1 (West Supp. 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-288.4 (Supp. 1 2006); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-9-108; Act of Feb. 2, 2007, ch. 2, § 1, 2007 Wash. Legis. Serv. 6 (West)
(amending WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.84.030). Others require a knowing mental state
by the actor. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/26-6 (West Supp. 2007); MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIM. LAW § 10-205 (LexisNexis 2006); Act of Mar. 16, 2007, ch. 10, 2007 Mont. Laws
S.B. 15 (amending MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-1). Still others require only recklessness.
See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-1-3 (West 2006); Assemb. B. 2385, 2007 Leg., 230th Sess.
(N.Y. 2007) (amending N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.21). Idaho looks for malice and
willfulness. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6409 (Supp. 2007). Yet many state statutes specify
no mental state requirement at all. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272 § 42A (LexisNexis
1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 123.1113 (West 2006); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-
1320.03 (LexisNexis Supp. 2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.30 (West Supp. 2007);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1380 (West Supp. 2007) (but see S.B. 756, 51st Leg., 1st
Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2007) (amending OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1380)); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 7517 (West Supp. 2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-13-17 (2006); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-17-317 (2006); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.055 (Vernon Supp. 2006);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3771 (2006).
117 Most of the statutes specify that they apply to burials, funerals, and memorial
services. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW § 10-205 (LexisNexis Supp. 2006). New
Jersey extends protection even to places of worship and funeral homes. NJ. Limits
Protests at Funerals for Soldiers Killed in Combat, N.J. REC., Aug. 22, 2006, at A4.
Mississippi prohibits protests near the homes of immediate family members of the
deceased on the day of a funeral. MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-35-18 (West Supp. 2006). Other
states have narrower limits: for instance, whereas many states apply speech limits to all
funerals; Florida protects only those of military veterans. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 871.01
(West Supp. 2006).
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B. Effect of Legislative Efforts
The outpouring of legislative efforts restricting speech at funerals does
not appear to have squelched the protestors' message. Far from fearing
funeral protest statutes, the WBC seems to welcome the attention that they
generate.118 In fact, before lawmakers acted to protect funerals, Fred Phelps
asked them to try, saying, "I look forward to it. I want to see those jackasses
up there wrestle with the First Amendment."1 19 And, after several laws took
effect, Phelps' daughter Margie Phelps rejoiced, explaining that "[t]he press,
the Patriot Guard and the president are delivering our message in spite of
themselves."' 120 Rather than silencing the WBC's unpopular message, funeral
protest statutes amplified it-especially to those not present at funerals.
Moreover, the government restrictions have not curtailed the WBC's
ability to reach funeral attendees themselves. Church members continue to
protest within eyesight of mourners, making their point despite complying
with distance requirements imposed by funeral protest statutes. 121 For
instance, soon after Congress passed the federal act, WBC members
announced plans to protest at each of the 122 national cemeteries with only
slight modifications to bring their tactics into compliance with the new
funeral protest law. 122 More expansive state laws, such as Iowa's 500-foot
ban, also have failed to deter the WBC's protests.123 And, generally, the
church members have said that funeral protest laws prove ineffectual: "That
legislation will not interfere one bit with us," according to Phelps' daughter,
Shirley Phelps-Roper. 124 "We're never within 300 feet," one family member
said. "We never were before they passed that goofy, worthless, impotent
law."'1 25 In short, although funeral protest statutes place significant limits on
118 Mann, supra note 8.
19 Id.
120 Alan Bjerga, Funeral Protest Faces New Law, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, June
6, 2006, at A6.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Westboro Protestors Keep Distance at Iowan's Funeral, WICHITA EAGLE, Apr.
18, 2006.
124 Tim Hoover, Church Group to Continue Protests at Funerals of Soldiers: New
Laws Are No Deterrent, Member Says, KANSAS CITY STAR, Jan. 25, 2006, at B3. The
WBC skipped one funeral in Wisconsin after alleging that authorities threatened to arrest
church members, but government officials in that jurisdiction vehemently have denied
that they ever contacted the church with such a message. Larry Oakes, Wisconsin Law
Deters Funeral Protesters, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRiB., Mar. 7, 2006, at 2B.
125 Thomas W. Krause, Protest May Test State's Funeral Law, TAMPA TRIB., July 6,
2006, at 1.
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protestors, the protestors still convey their message to their intended
audiences.
Notwithstanding their continued ability to protest at funerals, WBC
protestors remain able to disseminate a strikingly similar message at
alternative physical venues. For example, the church members "expanded
their protests from services for dead soldiers to veterans hospitals [including]
Walter Reed Army Medical Center. . . [with] signs that said, 'Thank God for
maimed soldiers." ' 126 They have protested hospitals in other areas as well. 127
Finally, the WBC continues to spread its message through the media.
The church, for example, manages a slew of colorful Internet websites. 128 In
recent years, church leaders also have appeared on several television
programs, including shows as varied as "Hannity and Colmes" and "The
Tyra Banks Show."' 129 Despite funeral protest statutes, the WBC's message
continues to draw plenty of attention through alternative channels.
V. THE INFIRMITY OF CURRENT FUNERAL PROTEST LITIGATION
A. Phelps v. Hamilton, McQueary v. Stumbo, Phelps-Roper v. Nixon,
and Phelps-Roper v. Taft
The WBC has waged an intense battle over the constitutionality of
funeral protest statutes. 130 Not surprisingly-given the Court's confusing
approach to privacy-based fixed and floating zones as well as the huge
126 Phelps and Family Say They 'l Picket Veterans Hospitals, WICHITA EAGLE, Apr.
6, 2006, at B8.
127 George, supra note 54.
128 The WBC manages at least seven websites, including
www.thesignsofthetimes.net, www.smellthebrimstone.com, www.godhatesamerica.com,
www.priestsrapeboys.com, www.godhatessweden.com, www.godhatescanada.com, and
www.godhatesfags.com. Snyder v. Phelps, No. RDB-06-1389, 2006 WL 3081106, at *1
n.1 (D. Md. Oct. 30, 2006).
129 Kendall, supra note 24.
130 Although no appellate court has reviewed a funeral protest law, such a contest
seems imminent. In addition to instigating McQueary, Nixon, and Taft, the American
Civil Liberties Union filed a complaint in the Eastern District of Missouri. In that case,
the court denied without explanation the plaintiff's request to enjoin the statute, and
shortly thereafter granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. Phelps-Roper v. Humphreys,
06-CV-130-SNL (E.D. Mo. filed Sept. 18, 2006). A defamation case, Snyder v. Phelps, is
pending against WBC members in Maryland. The case survived a motion to dismiss on
October 30, 2006. Snyder v. Phelps, No. RDB-06-1389, 2006 WL 3081106, at *1 (D.
Md. Oct. 30, 2006). Finally, an appellate court previously upheld a temporary injunction
enjoining the WBC from picketing near a Kansas church. St. David's Episcopal Church
v. Westboro Baptist Church, Inc., 921 P.2d 821 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996).
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variety of statutes enacted already-the cases thus far involving funeral
protest statutes have produced a messy status quo.
The first court review of funeral protest law actually occurred more than
a decade ago, when the WBC began to protest at funerals in Kansas. 131 In
that case, Phelps v. Hamilton, a Kansas federal district court reviewed the
conviction of a WBC member under a Kansas statute prohibiting, among
other things, "picketing before or about" any funeral service. 132 The Tenth
Circuit in Hamilton ruled that because the statute failed to provide speakers
clear notice about when and where protests could occur, its vagueness
created in protestors a genuine fear of prosecution and likely chilled their
speech. 133
The recent flurry of court decisions began in September 2006 when a
federal district judge granted a preliminary injunction preventing Kentucky
from enforcing its 300-foot fixed zone around funerals. 134 The judge in
McQueary v. Stumbo declared Kentucky's statute content-neutral because its
provisions applied "evenhandedly to all speakers, not simply the WBC" and
prohibited picketing "no matter the content or the speaker" involved. 135 The
statute served a significant, Frisby-based privacy interest, namely to:
protect citizens from unwelcome communications-including offensive
communications-where the communications invade substantial privacy
interests in an essentially intolerable manner, as where the communications
are directed at citizens in their homes or where the communications are
directed at a "captive" audience and are so obtrusive that individuals cannot
avoid exposure to them. 136
However, the Kentucky statute failed to withstand intermediate scrutiny
because it was overbroad: The McQueary court found that the fixed zone
proscribed a substantial excess of speech, picketing, and leafleting. 137 It
reached speech that was unrelated to a funeral regardless of whether that
131 See Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 1309, 1315, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997).
132 Id.; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4015 (1995).
133 See Hamilton, 122 F.3d 1309, 1315, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997). For a discussion of
Phelps v. Hamilton and its subsequent history, see Megan Dunn, Note, The Right to Rest
in Peace: Missouri Prohibits Protesting at Funerals, 71 Mo. L. REv. 1117, 1126-28
(2006). In response to Phelps' 1993 lawsuit, the Kansas legislature amended its funeral
protest statute to specify that it limited protests only one hour before, and two hours after,
a funeral. Hamilton, 122 F.3d at 1323; see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4015(e) (1995).
134 McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975 (E.D. Ky. 2006).
135 Id. at 985.
136 Id. at 989.
13 7 Id. at 996.
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speech actually could disrupt the funeral.' 38 Finally, the McQueary court
noted that the 300-foot zone affected substantially more speech than did
restrictions that the Supreme Court previously upheld in Frisby, Hill, and
Madsen.139 Even the Frisby privacy interest could not justify Kentucky's
attempt to limit speech.
In contrast to the Kansas and Kentucky cases, the January 2007 ruling in
Phelps-Roper v. Nixon resulted in defeat for the WBC. 140 In that case, a
federal district judge denied a request by church members to enjoin
Missouri's, funeral protest statute. 141 The statute prohibited "picketing or
other protest activities in front of or about any location at which a funeral is
held" within an hour of a funeral's beginning and end. 142 Like the court in
McQueary, the Nixon court found the statute content-neutral, located ample
alternatives for the speech that it restricted, 143 and identified a sufficient
government interest, in this case freedom "from interference by other citizens
while they mourn the death of friends or family."' 144 Nixon cited Frisby and
acknowledged the State of Missouri's contention that "spectators to a funeral
are more captive than citizens in their own homes," because, whereas people
can leave their homes, "a funeral spectator cannot leave the funeral or
procession without missing the opportunity to pay last respects to the
deceased."1 45
The Nixon court, however, parted ways with the McQueary court in its
determination that the funeral protest statute carried sufficient tailoring to
survive the preliminary injunction review.146 Without much discussion, the
Nixon court found that the tailoring of the Missouri statute sufficed because it
approximated limits upheld by the Supreme Court in Frisby, Madsen, and
Hill.14 7 With that finding, the court upheld Missouri's statute.
13 8 Id.
139/Id
140 Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, No. 06-4156-CV-C-FJG, 2007 WL 273437, at *6 (W.D.
Mo. Jan. 26, 2007) (notice of appeal filed Feb. 1, 2007); see also Dunn, supra note 133 at
1138-39 (arguing that federal courts are likely to uphold the Missouri statute).
141 Nixon, 2007 WL 273437, at *6.
142 MO. ANN. STAT. § 578.501(2) (West Supp. 2007).
143 Nixon, 2007 WL 273437, at *4.
144 Id. at *3.
145 Id. (emphasis removed).
146 Id. at *4.
147 Id. This finding creates an interesting tension with McQueary, which used those
cases for opposite effect. The court also denied a motion by the Phelps plaintiffs to
declare that the Missouri statute was unduly vague. Id.
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After Nixon, the next analysis of a funeral protest statute involved Ohio's
300-foot fixed zone-which resembled Kentucky's invalidated zone-as
well as its 300-foot floating zone. In Phelps-Roper v. Taft, the Northern
District of Ohio affirmed the Ohio statute's Frisby-based government interest
as well as the ample alternatives that it left open to speakers. 148 And like
Nixon, the Ohio decision differed with McQueary, approving the tailoring of
Ohio's 300-foot fixed zone and finding that it "is not substantially broader
than necessary."' 149 The decision did not explain this divergence from
McQueary. The floating zone, by contrast, failed the Northern District's
overbreadth analysis because it carried "substantial" overbreadth. 150 The Taft
court also did not explain its conclusion regarding floating zones in any
detail.
B. The Rule ofHamilton, McQueary, Nixon, and Taft
In general, courts in Hamilton, McQueary, Nixon, and Taft have
approached speech restrictions in a consistent, Frisby-based manner. After
determining that the statutes under review were content-neutral, each court
searched for a significant government interest, narrow tailoring, and ample
alternative channels. 151 In each case, the adequacy of the statute's tailoring
ostensibly determined its constitutionality. Still, the courts reached startlingly
different outcomes in the four cases. Whereas the McQueary court found 300
feet too large for a fixed zone, the Nixon court found that distance
appropriate. 152 And whereas Hamilton found "before or about" unduly
vague, Nixon found "in front of or about" permissibly clear. Indeed, the only
definite area lacking inconsistency in the courts' holdings is the area with the
148 The WBC apparently conceded that Ohio's statute operated in a content-neutral
fashion. Phelps-Roper v. Taft, No. 1:06 CV 2038, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20831, at "15-
16, *21 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 23, 2007). Reliance on Frisby and McQueary appears in the
Ohio decision at *13.
149 Id. at *"17-18.
150 Id. at*18-19.
151 Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, 2007, No. 06-4156-CV-C-FJG, WL 273437, at *3-4
(W.D. Mo. Jan. 26, 2007) (notice of appeal filed Feb. 1, 2007); McQueary v. Stumbo,
453 F. Supp. 2d 975, 986 (E.D. Ky. 2006).
152 The Kentucky statute did not conform to the narrow tailoring requirement
because it would prohibit speech that funeral participants could neither see nor hear.
McQueary, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 996. By contrast, the Nixon court concluded that the
Missouri statute's tailoring satisfied the requirement based on Supreme Court precedents
on focused picketing-namely, Frisby, Hill, and Madsen. Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, No.
06-4156-CV-C-FJG, 2007 WL 273437, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 26, 2007).
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least litigation-floating zones, which Taft invalidated but no other court has
reviewed.153
Appellate review of these four cases could affect numerous state statutes.
If higher courts adopted McQueary instead of Taft and Nixon, they would
require courts to invalidate twenty-three state statutes that include fixed
zones of 300 feet or larger.' 54 Moreover, if the McQueary overbreadth
reasoning applies to all fixed zones, not just zones as large as 300 feet, courts
also must invalidate smaller fixed zones in nine additional states.1 55 As many
as thirteen statutes (in addition to Ohio's) might be invalidated under Taft; it
is unclear whether Taft's disapproval of Ohio's floating zone tailoring might
apply to all floating zones or merely floating zones as large as Ohio's (300
feet).156 Finally, courts could employ the Hamilton decision's requirement
for specific time limits on protests to invalidate the six statutes that do not
specify when protests cannot occur. 57
153 Taft, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20831 at *22. Additionally, if Hamilton requires a
definite time element to funeral protest statutes, the courts may also be consistent in that
respect.
154 These states are Delaware, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Missouri,
Ohio, and Wyoming (300 feet); Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Wisconsin (all 500
feet); Mississippi, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Texas (1000 feet); and Montana
(1500 feet). See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text. Courts also could invalidate
the federal statute on this basis. 38 U.S.C.A. § 2413 (2006).
155 States with fixed zones smaller than 300 feet include Illinois and Utah (200 feet),
Arkansas, Connecticut, and New Hampshire (150 feet), and Colorado, Maryland, New
York, and Vermont (100 feet). See supra notes 10 1-103 and accompanying text.
156 Floating zones appear to be unconstitutional because of their wide reach and
their complete inconsistency with other Supreme Court precedents. See, e.g., Frisby v.
Schultz, 487 U.S.* 474, 483 (1988) (avoiding unconstitutional overbreadth by narrowing
the town ordinance so that it excluded parades); see also Rebecca Bland, Note, The
Respect for America's Fallen Heroes Act: Conflicting Interests Raise Hell with the First
Amendment, 75 UMKC L. REV. 523, 538 (2006) (analogizing funeral protest statute grace
periods with those invalidated in Frisby, Grayned, and Madsen).
157 Funeral protest statutes lacking time limits exist in Florida, Indiana, Maine,
Maryland, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island, and Washington. See FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 871.01 (West 2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-1-3 (West 2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17-A, § 501-A (2007); MD. CODE ANN., CRiM. LAW § 10-205 (West 2006); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 30-53-3 (West 2007); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.21 (Gould 2007); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 11-11-1 (2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.84.030 (West 2007). The
specified grace periods appear less likely to be invalidated. For a decision upholding a
grace period after the conclusion of a protected event, see Hill v. State, 381 So. 2d 206,
212 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979).
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C. Problems Highlighted by the Current Case Law
In addition to the clear contradiction between McQueary's and Taft's
holdings regarding fixed zones, as well as the potential conflict between
Nixon and Hamilton,158 at least four other problems plague the status quo.159
As this section explains, these problems underscore the difficult situation
facing courts when they seek to evaluate fixed and floating zones using
privacy doctrine as their guide.
First, courts' apparent preference for loosely defined fixed zone
parameters, such as Missouri's "in front of or about" zone, leads to the
overbreadth problems that rendered Kentucky's statute unconstitutional.
Speech on private property, a major concern in McQueary, easily could be
punishable under the Missouri "in front of or about" language. That language
also might reach the kinds of non-offensive speech that concerned the
McQueary court (e.g., an ice cream truck passing a funeral would be "in
front of or about" it). Thus, the Missouri statute approved in Nixon likely
would fail the demanding tailoring requirements of the McQueary court.
Second, if courts indeed prefer such vague language, the significant
under-inclusivity of resulting provisions causes additional problems.' 60
Missouri's "in front of or about" terminology easily could neglect much of
the speech at the root of the harm. As dozens of statutes imply, some of the
precise evils that funeral protest statutes aim to eradicate occur within a fixed
zone, but not necessarily within the narrower "in front of or about" region.16 1
158 Despite the numerous inconsistencies and undesirable policy outcomes that the
most recent funeral protest cases produced, Hamilton does not appear to raise significant
constitutional issues. Indeed, the Kansas legislature's subsequent compliance with the
Hamilton decision; the existence of specific time elements in twenty-six of the current
funeral protest statutes; and the absence of vague time elements in the remaining statutes,
might indicate legislatures' acknowledgement that Hamilton stands on firm constitutional
ground.
159 But see Barry P. McDonald, Speech and Distrust: Rethinking the Content
Approach to Protecting the Freedom of Expression, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1347, 1387
(2006) (arguing that courts should uphold all of the statutes because one cannot
"seriously [argue] that such a limited restriction would have a substantially adverse
impact on the marketplace of public debate, or on the church members' ability to feel
fully self-realized" and because "the government should ... have the right to enact such
restrictions out of respect for the dead soldiers' sacrifices, regardless of its views about
the message"); Dunn, supra note 133, at 1139 (predicting that federal courts will uphold
the Missouri statute).
160 The Supreme Court held in R.A. V v. City of St. Paul that underbroad speech
restrictions may be unconstitutional because by leaving part of their targeted evil
unaddressed, they run the risk of discriminating based upon the content of the speech.
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395-97 (1992).
161 See supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
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For example, a person's speech may be very disruptive when it occurs 200
feet away from a funeral, yet it likely would remain beyond the reach of the
Missouri statute. At the same time, some statutes enable prosecution of non-
disruptive picketers who stand much closer to a funeral. Take, for example, a
protestor yelling and screaming behind a wall, audible but not visible to
funeral attendees. That protestor might not stand "in front of or about" the
funeral, but she still would generate the disruptive evil against which the
statute aims to protect. Therefore, the Missouri statute seems not to satisfy
the stringent tailoring requirements of the Kentucky court. For this reason,
Nixon and McQueary are difficult to reconcile.
Third, the status quo is problematically inconsistent with Supreme Court
precedent. In particular, the tailoring specificity required by the McQueary
court conflicts with the Supreme Court's approach to similar fixed zones in
Boos, Burson, and Madsen. In the Burson decision, which evaluated a statute
similar to the one enjoined in McQueary, the Court declared that it was
impossible and unnecessary to justify a particular distance in a fixed zone.162
Given courts' current propensity to analogize funeral protest statutes to these
other privacy-based protections, they should permit fixed zones in the funeral
protest context for the sake of consistency with the law of focused protests
generally.
Finally, favoring the vague "in front of or about" language over more
specific fixed zone language may create an unconstitutional chilling effect.
Whereas protestors objectively can determine whether they stand within a
certain number of feet of a funeral, they will experience much more difficulty
knowing when they are "in front of or about" the location. The approved
Missouri language, therefore, does not provide helpful notice to protestors
about how they can communicate lawfully. They understandably might fear
prosecution. The resulting chilling effect essentially expands the no-speech
zone far beyond the designated "in front of or about" region. In short, a fixed
zone nominally might reach more speech than Missouri's zone does, but its
impact could be far worse for free speech.
The status quo's overbreadth, underbreadth, tension with Supreme Court
precedent, and problematic policy outcomes indicate that courts simply
cannot establish a principled division between permissible and impermissible
fixed zones. In other words, the specific permissible scope of a focused
picketing restriction does not flow from the identification of a Frisby-based
privacy interest. The recent funeral protest decisions demonstrate the
difficulty in drafting and reviewing statutes aiming to protect privacy. It
162 Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 208-09 (1992).
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appears nearly impossible to craft a provision that targets all of the evils that
frustrate privacy without reaching any additional speech. 163
D. The Need for a New Approach
Even if courts can reconcile the outcomes in recent funeral protest cases,
relying on privacy in this particular context remains risky for two additional
reasons. First, advocates already have failed to persuade courts to extend the
privacy justification to support protest restrictions in a context similar to
funerals. 164 The church protest ordinance invalidated in Olmer roughly
approximates Missouri's funeral protest statute. 165 Factually, the government
interest in protecting children from offensive images at church services
strongly resembles the goal of preserving the solemnity of a funeral. 166 And
the means by which the laws in question attempted to limit speech are nearly
identical. Yet the Olmer court declined to extend Frisby because of the
Supreme Court's express statement that only the unique nature of the home
163 See, e.g., Alan Phelps, Picketing and Prayer: Restricting Freedom of Expression
Outside Churches, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 271, 297-304 (1999) (arguing that "an attempt to
pass an all-inclusive ordinance [limiting speech near churches] to avoid being labeled a
content-based restriction will run headlong into the narrow-tailoring requirement").
164 See id. at 297-301 (comparing Frisby and Olmer and arguing that "[i]f the
current Supreme Court were to expand the captive audience doctrine beyond the four
walls of the home, churches present one of the strongest cases"); Carrie L. Johnson, Note,
Unwanted Speech and the State's Interest in Protecting Religious Free Exercise:
Drawing First Amendment Lines in Olmer v. City of Lincoln, 34 CREIGHTON L. REv.
423, 469 (2001) (describing similarities between churchgoers and residents of private
homes). The Supreme Court in 2004 recognized a privacy right for family members in
control of the bodies and images of the recently-deceased. National Archives and
Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157 (2004). Recently, however, the Tenth Circuit
determined that this privacy right for the grieving does not extend to funeral attendance,
finding against a family seeking to prevent photographers from attending a funeral on the
basis of privacy. Showler v. Harper's Magazine Foundation, 222 F.App'x 755 (10th Cir.
2007).
165 Compare Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, No. 06-4156-CV-C-FJG, 2007 WL 273437, at
*2 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 26, 2007) (notice of appeal filed Feb. 1, 2007) and supra notes 151-
52 and accompanying text with Olmer v. City of Lincoln, 192 F.3d 1176, 1182 (8th Cir.
1999).
166 Funerals are similar to church services because both involve captive audiences
seeking peace and quiet for a temporary event. While differences between these contexts
certainly exist, they have more in common with each other than they do with the interests
at issue in other Supreme Court picketing cases, such as those involving embassies,
polling locations, and abortion clinics.
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justifies such strong protection.' 67 Courts similarly might reject funeral
protest statutes justified solely by privacy. As in Olmer, a court reviewing
such laws could withhold Frisby's protection for fear that applying it would
lead to a classic slippery slope problem. 168
Just as Olmer's factual differences with Frisby warranted different
outcomes, courts also might find that funerals and abortion clinics present
incomparable factual contexts. In short, the protection that medical patients
need differs significantly from the safeguards that grieving funeral attendees
require. 169 The Supreme Court's primary concern in abortion cases has been
enabling patients and employees to enter clinics without intimidation or
physical confrontation. 170 To serve such an end, zones protecting patients
within eight feet-as in Hill-may be satisfactory. By contrast, funeral
protest statutes seek not only to prevent confrontation and to ensure peaceful
entry, but also to preserve the solemnity of the funeral occasion itself.17 1 For
167 Olmer, 192 F.3d at 1181-82; see also Stanley, supra note 73, at 295 (arguing
that Olmer illustrates great reluctance within courts about extending Frisby to contexts
other than the home).
168 Olmer, 192 F.3d at 1182. But see Eugene Volokh, Burying Funeral Protests,
National Review Online, March 23, 2006, http://nationalreview.com/comment/
volokh200603230730.asp (predicting that "it's a good bet that courts will find that the
interest in protecting the privacy of the grieving at a funeral is at least as strong as the
interest in protecting the privacy of people at their homes").
169 For a similar argument about the inadequacy of applying abortion clinic
precedent to protests outside churches that offend children, see Phelps, supra note 163.
But see Johnson, supra note 164, at 471 (calling for legislators to draw bubble zones-
similar to those upheld in Hill-to protect children from offensive speech outside
churches).
170 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715 (2000).
171 As if guided by a national advisory group, several states enacted strikingly
similar legislative intent language that cites the privacy interest as well as an inchoate
interest in "peace" and avoiding "distress." See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7517
(West Supp. 2007) ("The General Assembly finds and declares that ... [interests
include] privately and peacefully mourning," and that "[p]icketing of commemorative
services causes emotional disturbance and distress to grieving families."); see also KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-4015 (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:33-8.1 (West Supp. 2007); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1380 (West Supp. 2006). For slightly different approaches, see GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-11-34.2 (Supp. 2006), citing the interest in grieving "without unwanted
impediment, disruption, disturbance, or interference .. "; see also 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/26-6 (West Supp. 2007) (citing the protection of "the unique nature of funeral and
memorial services and the heightened opportunity for extreme emotional distress... [as
well as] privacy and ability to mourn" as legislative aims). For an alternative approach
proposed for protecting church services from protests, see Phelps, supra note 163, at
309-12 (suggesting that speech be limited whenever it "can cause audience members to
adopt outwardly a different viewpoint on some public issue, not because of the idea's
merit, but because of the coercive pressure the protest itself creates").
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some outdoor funerals-unlike indoor abortion clinics-there is no safe
haven within which protestors cannot be seen or heard. Funeral protestors,
therefore, spoil solemnity with speech activities designed to distract and
inflame funeral attendees and to transform funerals into political events.
Unlike abortion protests, these tactics can destroy another protected activity
from eight feet away. The speech restrictions appropriate to ensure privacy
and access at an abortion clinic thus cannot adequately serve the government
interest that animates funeral protest limits.
If the inconsistencies between McQueary and Nixon suggest that
appellate courts will review funeral protest statutes carefully, the factual
differences between funerals and activities protected by previously-litigated
statutes beg those courts and the litigants before them to adopt a different
legal approach altogether. Privacy might ultimately provide courts with a
basis for upholding funeral protest statutes. But there is no guarantee. 172
Given such considerable uncertainty, supporters of these statutes should look
to supplement their arguments with support from other legal doctrines. This
Note proposes that the one Supreme Court decision and the framework that it
establishes may provide a more certain, logical, and clear basis for future
challenges to the constitutionality of funeral protest statutes.
VI. ESTABLISHING A COMPATIBILITY FRAMEWORK
A. Background
Rather than relying solely on the problematic privacy arguments,
litigants and courts in future funeral protest cases should also emphasize the
utter incompatibility of free speech and funerals. The essential basis for this
compatibility rationale would be Grayned v. City of Rockford.173 Grayned
involved the prosecution of a picketer who violated Rockford, Illinois
ordinances banning protests and noisy disruption of schools while they were
172 For additional criticism of the application of the privacy interest to funeral
protests, see McDonald, supra note 159, at 1387 (arguing for strict scrutiny because
"[u]nder an honest application of current doctrine, even though such [funeral protest]
regulations are facially content-neutral, they would likely not withstand First Amendment
scrutiny because they would be very difficult to justify as being unrelated to the content
of the affected expression").
173 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). McQueary cites Grayned
only twice, for propositions related to the content of unwanted communications, at 987,
and in explaining the Madsen decision's dependence on the abortion clinic context of its
regulations, at 994. McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975, 987, 994 (2006). Nixon
does not cite Grayned or its compatibility rationale. See Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, No. 06-
4156-CV-C-FJG, 2007 WL 273437 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 26, 2007) (notice of appeal filed
2/1/07).
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in session. 174 The Supreme Court found Rockford's anti-noise ordinance
sufficiently tailored because it targeted only speech that was "actually
incompatible with normal school activity." 175 In critical language, the Court
explained that the "nature of a place [and] the pattern of its normal activities
[will] dictate the kinds of regulations of time, place, and manner that are
reasonable."' 176 The Grayned decision then announced that "[t]he crucial
question is whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with
the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time." 177
Since Grayned, the Supreme Court has utilized compatibility language in
a variety of other contexts. 178 The concept appeared in Schad v. Borough of
Mount Ephraim; the Court invalidated a time, place, and manner restriction
because the speech that it limited-live adult entertainment-was not
"incompatible with the uses presently permitted" by the municipality.' 79
Similar language also appeared in the Court's debate about a rule against
distributing pamphlets at a state fair. 180 In Heffron v. International Society
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., the Court upheld the fair's regulation after
explaining that "the significance of the governmental interest must be
174 Grayned, 408 U.S. at 106. In addition to upholding. the noise prohibitions of
Rockford's ordinance, the Supreme Court overturned the picketing prohibitions because
they included a content-based exception for labor picketers. Id. at 107.
175 Id. at 113. The ordinance also permitted punishment only when a speaker acted
with the intent to disrupt and when his actions caused actual disruption. Id.
176 Id. at 116 (internal quotations omitted).
177 Id. For criticism of the view that Grayned elevates the constitutional status of
compatibility, see Michael S. Maurer, Regulating Embassy Picketing in the Public
Forum, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 908, 923-24 (1987) (arguing that "[a]lthough the site in
Grayned was important to the Court's reasoning, the antinoise ordinance passed
constitutional muster because it did not discriminate against points of view... Grayned
[does] not stand for the proposition that the site alone dictates the restrictions").
178 See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 184-85 nn.l-8 (1983) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (providing examples of the principle that
"[e]very citizen lawfully present in a public place has a right to engage in peaceable and
orderly expression that is not incompatible with the primary activity of the place in
question" regardless of whether the "place is a school, a library, a private lunch counter,
the grounds of a statehouse, the grounds of the United States Capitol, a bus terminal, an
airport, or a welfare center"). For an example of the compatibility rationale in lower
courts, see Judge Bork's opinion in Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1462 (D.C. Cir.
1986).
179 Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 75 (1981). The Schad Court
declared that the compatibility analysis is "the initial question in determining the validity
of the exclusion." Id.
180 Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 649-52
(1981).
1502 [Vol. 68:1469
FREE SPEECH AND FUNERALS
assessed in light of the characteristic nature and function of the particular
forum involved."' 81
The compatibility rationale also found a voice in a 1965 case involving
speech outside courthouses. 182 In Cox v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court
upheld a statute prohibiting "pickets or parades in or near a building housing
a court of the State of Louisiana" with the intent of disrupting justice. 183
After identifying a legitimate state interest in "protecting [the] judicial
system from the pressures which picketing near a courthouse might
create," 184 the Cox Court declared the statute "narrowly drawn to punish
specific conduct that infringes a substantial state interest in protecting the
judicial process."' 85 Even the First Amendment could not justify the tactics
of the protestors in Cox, which proved incompatible with the important
government interest of the administration ofjustice.1 86
The Boos decision also involved some discussion of compatibility. 187
One clause that the Supreme Court approved in Boos prohibited protestors
from congregating and refusing to disperse within 500 feet of an embassy. 188
In upholding this provision, the Supreme Court approvingly cited Grayned
for the proposition that a statute "crafted for a particular context [will affect
only speech that would disrupt] normal embassy activities.' ' 189 That
reasoning supported the Court's finding that the statute was not vague and
buttressed the overall holding that the important government interest in the
case necessitated extensive speech restrictions.1 90
Individual justices also occasionally employ compatibility language.
Several years after Grayned, the compatibility rationale appeared in Justice
Powell's concurrence in Greer v. Spock,191 In his opinion supporting speech
restrictions at a military base, Justice Powell explained that his approach was
181 Id. at 650-51.
182 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
183 Id. at 560.
184 Id. at 562.
185 Id. at 564.
186 Id.
187 See supra Part III.A.
188 Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 329 (1988). Before this case reached the Supreme
Court, the appeals court narrowed the statute to prohibit speech that was "directed at an
embassy" and that might create "a threat to the security or peace of the embassy." Id. at
330 (quoting Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
189 Id. at 332.
190 Id.
191 424 U.S. 828, 842-49 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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"analogous to that ... described in Grayned."'192 Speech at military bases
could be limited, according to Powell, because of the "basic
incompatibility... between the communication and the primary activity of
[the] area." 193 In that light, "the public interest in insuring the political
neutrality of the military" could "justifqy] the limited infringement" that the
speech restriction poses. 194 Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Heffron
also declared that "[i]n no way could I agree that respondents' desired
'manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity' of
the fair."' 195 Additionally, Justice O'Connor's concurrence in International
Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, a decision upholding speech
restrictions in airport terminals, explained that "[f]ace-to-face solicitation is
incompatible with the airport's functioning in a way that the other, permitted
activities are not." 196
Courts and litigants seeking to adopt the compatibility rationale may also
draw upon arguments made by courts at the state level. The highest court of
at least one state-Connecticut-has adopted a Grayned-based compatibility
test.197 A California appellate court also announced that it would follow a
similar test. 198 And the Montana Supreme Court has employed the
compatibility test to invalidate at least one speech restriction. 199
Still, the compatibility language appears only sparingly in recent focused
picketing cases. In Madsen, for example, the Supreme Court suggested
briefly that it will "take account of the place to which the regulations apply"
when evaluating the appropriate tailoring.200 The Frisby opinion did not cite
192 Id. at 843.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 848.
195 Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 658 n.2
(1981) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Schad v. Borough
of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 75 (1981) (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104, 116 (1972)).
196 Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 689 (1992)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the opinion and concurring in the judgment).
197 See Connecticut v. Linares, 655 A.2d 737, 753-54 (Conn. 1995) (announcing
that Connecticut would "adopt the 'compatibility' test, as expressed in Grayned ... for
claims brought under the Connecticut constitution that involve restrictions on speech on
public property").
198 U.C. Nuclear Weapons Labs Conversion Project v. Lawrence Livermore Lab.,
201 Cal. Rptr. 837, 843 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (announcing that the California court would
adopt the basic incompatibility test).
199 See Dom v. Bd. of Trs. of Billings Sch. Dist. #2, 661 P.2d 426, 433 (Mont.
1983).
200 Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 772 (1994).
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Grayned and discussed the role of context in speech restrictions only while
evaluating whether the limits in that case affected a public forum.20 1 Hill
cited Grayned several times, but never for the notion of compatibility.20 2
However, because of the differences between the facts of those cases and
those in funeral protest litigation, recent focused picketing cases have not
needed to rely on the compatibility rationale as much as funeral protest cases
eventually might.
B. The Compatibility Approach
In addition to citing the government interest in privacy, courts and
litigants seeking to preserve the dignity of funerals should turn to a different
approach. A more relevant, effective, and constitutionally consistent
argument for the statutes would borrow from the Grayned compatibility
reasoning. Courts could find that the government interest in funeral protest
statutes stems from the complete incompatibility of intentionally disruptive
protests and funeral services. A compatibility rationale could proceed as
follows:
When a protected activity can occur during only one particular time, place,
and manner, the government may enact restrictions on speech activities lacking
similar time, place, and manner requirements when such activities disrupt the
effectiveness of the first activity, so long as any such restrictions isolate speech
activities-defined by their time, manner, or place-that are totally
incompatible with the first activity.
This rationale would help courts to determine which statutes pass
constitutional muster. For example, in the funeral protest context, the
compatibility rationale would permit speech restrictions only to the extent
that they are necessary to prevent the protected activity lacking time, place,
and manner requirements-protests-from destroying the protected activity
carrying particular requirements in those respects-funerals.
Of course, statutes serving this government interest still would need to
survive intermediate scrutiny review, so in some ways the evaluation would
parallel the Frisby test. But realistically, if a court followed Grayned, it
would weigh the government interest in funeral protest statutes more heavily
than courts do when they rely upon the Frisby privacy reasoning.20 3 Courts
201 Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481-82 (1988).
202 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 733 (2000); see also id. at 740 (Souter, J., joined
by O'Connor, Ginsberg,, and Breyer, J.J., concurring); id. at 748 n.2 (Scalia, J., joined by
Thomas, J., dissenting).
203 As demonstrated, for example, by its failure in Olmer. Olmer v. City of Lincoln,
192 F.3d 1176, 1182 (8th Cir. 1999).
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using compatibility also would benefit from a more relevant understanding of
the purpose underlying a focused-picketing statute-the priority of a
protected activity with particular time, place, and manner requirements over
another lacking similar needs. Thus, although courts superficially would
employ the same test, they could more easily evaluate the sufficiency of the
tailoring.
A second advantage to evaluating funeral protest statutes in compatibility
terms results from avoiding the politically-charged and impractical notion of
privacy. Privacy generates exceptional vitriol among courts and litigants. 20 4
By contrast, compatibility does not yet provoke controversy, and courts can
explain in common-sense terms what it means: two protected government
interests are incompatible when they cannot succeed simultaneously. In such
situations, time, place, and manner restrictions ultimately provide the greatest
protection to both activities by enabling each to occur.
Finally, a shift from privacy to compatibility might justify more
appropriate tailoring. As described supra, the Supreme Court has found that
privacy interests can be safeguarded by restrictions as small as eight feet-
distances far too small to protect funerals. 20 5 Establishing the compatibility
rationale could enable courts and litigants to establish a new, broader
tailoring requirement that justifies the current statutes and actually maintains
the solemnity of funerals more than eight feet ever could.
Courts will not need to fabricate out of whole cloth this rationale for the
statutes. Indeed, at least one funeral protest statute uses language similar to
Grayned's. North Carolina's prohibition refers to "conduct with the intent to
impede, disrupt, disturb, or interfere... with the normal activities and
functions occurring in the facilities or buildings where a funeral or memorial
service... is taking place." 206 Perhaps other states could adopt similar
language, or courts could refer to North Carolina's language when evaluating
other statutes' efforts to protect funerals. Focusing on this compatibility
interest, rather than the privacy interest that animated courts in recent cases,
might create additional hope for those seeking to preserve the solemnity of
funerals.
204 See, e.g., Hill, 530 U.S. at 752 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting)
(describing the privacy right to avoid undesired communication as nonexistent); William
E. Lee, The Unwilling Listener. Hill v. Colorado's Chilling Effect on Unorthodox Speech,
35 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 387, 390 (2002) (calling "the privacy interest in Hill ... a house
of cards that collapses upon close examination"). But see Robert D. Nauman, Note, The
Captive Audience Doctrine and Floating Buffer Zones: An Analysis of Hill v. Colorado,
30 CAP. U. L. REv. 769, 820-21 (2002) (arguing that Hill "seems to stand, in part, for
recognition that the right to privacy is important and is worth protecting, even in a public
forum").
205 See generally Hill, 530 U.S. 703.
206 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.4(a)(8) (Supp. 1 2006) (emphasis added).
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C. Remaining Challenges
The compatibility approach obviously is not a panacea. Even backed by a
stronger government interest and under review by courts employing
Grayned's approach, funeral protest statutes still would face at least four
major challenges. First, formalizing the compatibility rationale would require
courts to answer the difficult, slippery-slope question of what gives a person
the right to assert the need for compatibility.20 7 Limiting compatibility's
protection to important government interests provides only a partial answer
to this question because courts have recognized innumerable interests as
important.
The subjectivity of incompatibility might present a second concern-
vagueness. Even finding the mutual exclusivity of two simultaneous
government interests requires some degree ofjudgment.20 8
Third, whether courts use privacy or compatibility, an open question
remains: what would happen if the WBC protested politically important
funerals? For instance, most of the statutes ostensibly reach even protests
outside official state funerals. The same is true of funerals occurring not in
cemeteries or churches but on public property with unusual political
significance-for example, a town square. Or, protestors might challenge the
compatibility rationale by protesting at a funeral with a message directly
related to the funeral, such as protests against war, funerals generally, or the
person honored by the funeral. Courts seem unlikely to abide by limits on
protests within such traditional and powerful political contexts. 20 9
Finally, even if they employ the compatibility rationale, courts will
struggle to define an upper limit for funeral protest statutes. 210 The
compatibility rationale might justify upholding a fixed zone larger than what
privacy warranted in Frisby, Madsen, or Hill, but courts may struggle to read
207 See Stone, supra note 85, at 69 (arguing that "courts should [not] be in the
business of making such inquiries" because doing so inevitably will require judgments
about the content of the speech being regulated).
208 But the Grayned opinion addressed a similar concern, holding that the anti-noise
statute's compatibility test was not vague because "the measure [of] whether normal
school activity has been or is about to be disrupted" though imprecise, "clearly
'delineates its reach in words of common understanding."' Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104, 112 (1972) (quoting Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 616 (1968)).
209 See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 183-84 (1983), (invalidating a
federal statute prohibiting communicative displays near the Supreme Court).
210 Volokh, supra note 168 (predicting that "[o]nce the supposedly narrow exception
for residential picketing is broadened to cover funeral picketing, these two exceptions
(one older and one new) could then be used as precedents in arguments for more
exceptions (say, for churches or for medical facilities), which would eventually swallow
the rule").
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Grayned as justifying statutes that restrict speech by as much as 1,000
feet.211 The Supreme Court has never validated a fixed zone larger than 500
feet,212 and even the most effective protestors realistically could not disrupt a
quiet ceremony from such a great distance. The compatibility rationale also
probably could not justify so vast a prohibition on speech as that created by
floating zones near funeral processions, which deaden free speech through
large, roving areas in an unpredictable fashion.213
VII. CONCLUSION
The Frisby privacy-based rationale ultimately presents a risky legal basis
for limits on protests at funerals. Relying upon cases supporting access to
abortion clinics also creates problems. The Supreme Court's tailoring
requirement in these cases remains unpredictable-at best. Courts' laissez-
faire approach in evaluations of government interests, content-neutrality, and
ample alternative channels underlying focused picketing restrictions could
always change. Moreover, relying solely on the privacy approach unwisely
binds the law governing funeral protest statutes to what courts have approved
in highly unrelated contexts, such as abortion clinics. A better approach
might be the Grayned compatibility rationale, which could justify temporary
limits on funeral protests when they legitimately disrupt funerals.
Although the Supreme Court has applied this approach only a handful of
times, it is difficult to imagine a more appealing case for its formal
establishment than one involving protests at the funerals of Soldiers, Sailors,
Airmen, and Marines who have lost their lives while serving the country in
battle. Courts should give the rationale a try. Perhaps then families of
Marines like Specialist Jared Hartley could grieve for their loved ones
without fear of disruption-from anti-gay protestors or others-and with the
solemnity that their occasion deserves.
211 See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 168 (predicting that 300 feet is the largest fixed
zone that a Court might allow).
212 Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 316 (1988).
213 See Phelps-Roper v. Taft, No. 1:06 CV 2038, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20831, at
*18-19 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 23, 2007).
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